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COMMENTARY: STAKEHOLDER VALUES,
DISCLOSURE, AND MATERIALITY
Donald C. Langevoort*
To what extent should the SEC treat as material-and as such, at least
presumptively, the subject for mandatory disclosure in an issuer's 10-Ks
or proxy statements-data relating to company actions affecting
stakeholders such as labor, consumers, local communities, or the public
at large? When it began in earnest in the 1970s, the debate over "quali-
tative" materiality was largely about whether unadjudicated violations of
law had to be disclosed (particularly crimes like illegal campaign contri-
butions and commercial bribery). Gradually, this category of potential
disclosure responsibilities stretched to include labor policies and prac-
tices, charitable contributions, and various other indicia of a company's
supposed social character and integrity.1 In this Commentary, I want to
think through some of the issues associated with expanding disclosure
obligations in this area, especially if done in the name of noninvestor
stakeholders. In doing so, I will sound a mildly cautious note, notwith-
standing my embrace of the idea that firm managers do have moral obli-
gations to corporate stakeholders that go beyond the duty to maximize
short or long-term profits.
We should note first that there are two different kinds of arguments at
work in the "stakeholder" debate. The first, and more aggressive, is that
to the extent that corporations are simply webs of stakeholder interests
mediated by company managers, disclosure in the interests of other
stakeholders is justifiable on the same protective grounds as disclosure
for investors. The second argument retains investor primacy, but argues
that other stakeholder-oriented disclosure is needed so that inves-
tor/shareholders can evaluate properly the governance and financial per-
formance of the firm. Both arguments tend to end up at the same place,
Lee S. & Charles A. Speir Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University.
1. For good recountings of the history in this area, see generally Ralph C. Ferrara et
al., Disclosure of Information Bearing on Management Integrity and Competency, 76 Nw.
U. L. REV. 555 (1981), reviewing disclosure requirements regarding corporate directors
and officers, questionable and illegal corporate acts, and certain company policies, and
Bevis Longstreth, SEC Disclosure Policy Regarding Management Integrity, 38 BUS. LAW.
1413 (1983), addressing the issue of disclosure of information regarding corporate officers.
Of course, the management integrity question pre-dated the 1970s, especially in the classic
administrative proceeding, In re Franchard Corp., 42 S.E.C. 163, 169-78 (1964).
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which can tempt those committed ideologically to the former to invoke
the latter because of its more conventional rhetoric.
The core of orthodox securities regulation can be stated simply: we
want to promote stock price "integrity." That is to say, we want the price
at which investors buy or sell securities to reflect fairly the truth about
the issuer's current situation and insight about its prospects. We do this
because history teaches us that promoters, managers, brokers, and others
often have selfish reasons to manipulate prices, almost always by inflat-
ing them. Reputation provides a check on the incentive to deceive, but
hardly a complete one. So, we mandate disclosure and prohibit various
forms of fraud and misrepresentation. In this setting, the natural focus is
on pure economic value.
Even here, of course, there may be difficult administrative judgments.
Investors may have different utility functions and differing perceptions
about what constitutes a "fair" price. Are we safe to assume that inves-
tors seek only measurable financial return? What, for instance, are the
conflicts faced by a union that is both a large shareholder via pension
fund holdings and a labor representative?4 Furthermore, disclosure pol-
icy occasionally sacrifices the affirmative disclosure norm in the name of
corporate confidentiality-we allow issuers passively to conceal trade se-
crets and business strategies from the public, even if some investors will
be financially worse off as a result.5
It should be clear, then, that mandatory disclosure questions necessar-
2. Hence the classic rhetoric of "truth in securities." See generally Milton H. Cohen,
"Truth in Securities" Revisited, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1340 (1966) (covering the major securi-
ties acts and their effects on stock prices through freedom of information).
3. See Steve Thel, The Original Conception of Section 10(b) of the Securities Ex-
change Act, 42 STAN. L. REV. 385, 392-93 (1990) (referring to the power of the SEC under
section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act to regulate manipulative practices that influ-
ence securities prices).
4. See generally Stewart J. Schwab & Randall S. Thomas, Realigning Corporate
Governance: Shareholder Activism by Labor Unions, 96 MICH. L. REV. 1018 (1998) (pro-
viding an interesting commentary on the conflicts that arise when a labor union is a share-
holder and a labor representative).
5. See Edmund W. Kitch, The Theory and Practice of Securities Disclosure, 61
BROOK. L. REV. 763, 848-57 (1995) (arguing how disclosure of commercial information
and other corporate secrets can benefit competitors and hurt investment); see also Donald
C. Langevoort, Toward More Effective Risk Disclosure for Technology-Enhanced Invest-
ing, 75 WASH. U. L.Q. 753, 772-74 (1997) (arguing that a company should be exempt from
continuous disclosure of risk-related or adverse information that exposes business strat-
egy, plans, or secrets that could cause significant competitive injury); see generally Paul G.
Mahoney, Mandatory Disclosure as a Solution to Agency Problems, 62 U. CHI. L. REV.
1047 (1995) (taking the view that the mandatory disclosure system needs to be more fo-
cused and limited to ensure accuracy of corporate information).
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ily demand cost-benefit trade-offs, even in the conventional framework.
The commonplace analysis is to start by asking whether disclosure is
likely to benefit some significant category of investors in making fair
price assessments over and above what leaving it to the marketplace to
produce such information would accomplish.6 Then, three kinds of costs
are considered. The first is the direct cost (often in the form of legal and
accounting fees) of gathering, formatting, and disseminating the informa-
tion. The second is the litigation cost associated with enforcing any given
obligation, whether through SEC enforcement or private rights of action.
Finally, as noted above, there is the concern with legitimate corporate
confidentiality. This analytic process has led to a fairly aggressive set of
requirements relating to historic financial performance and managerial
conflicts of interest, reticence with respect to forward-looking informa-
tion, and subjective evaluations of business judgment.
The question posed in this Symposium is why should investor interests,
especially financial ones, be the sine qua non for disclosure regulation?
If we are coming to see investors as simply one kind of corporate
stakeholder, why not provide disclosure for the benefit of other
stakeholders (including public interests)? This question becomes all the
more interesting when we invoke, with attribution to Justice Louis Bran-
deis, the idea that the "sunlight" of disclosure has benefits in terms of
primary business behavior, which presumably will be "better" in an envi-
ronment of public accountability. Moreover, mandating disclosure about
some societally important issue is a form of legitimization, with at least
the potential for educating the public about its importance and hence
shaping the public's collective preferences. We are quickly tempted to
use securities disclosure for matters whether or not a significant number
of investors would treat such matters as material. Environmental protec-
tion and community impact of plant closings are two standard examples
of such information.
Why not? The most direct response to this question begins with the
kinds of costs described above. Especially in the aggregate, such social
disclosures can be very costly to prepare, especially if the disclosure is
very detailed or particularly subjective or open-ended. In the latter case,
especially, litigation over contested matters will be frequent, time con-
6. Mandatory disclosure can be preferable to market "scouring" for information in
two respects: first, it overcomes the natural inclination of managers to conceal some kinds
of private data; and second, it avoids the wasteful duplication of effort that comes when
too many analysts chase down the same data. Obviously, that duplication is not necessar-
ily wasteful with respect to more subjective information. See generally John C. Coffee, Jr.,
Market Failure and the Economic Case for a Mandatory Disclosure System, 70 VA. L. REV.
717, 733-34 (1984) (arguing that a mandatory disclosure system would be more efficient).
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suming, and expensive-and sometimes, at least, without substantial
merit. Of course, that by itself is not dispositive if the aggregate of bene-
fits exceeds these costs. Yet here I am somewhat of a skeptic. To be
sure, a prima facie case of benefit is made to the extent that disclosure of
these other stakeholder-interest matters would actually cause these
stakeholders to behave differently.7 But there are numerous situations
where the emphasis is much more on Brandeisian sunlight-disclosure as
a good thing simply because of the accountability it introduces.
Psychologists have shown that accountability affects judgment and de-
cision making. However, we should be careful here before deciding that
accountability is necessarily all to the good. Psychologists have also
shown that people's reaction to being held accountable can be as much as
anything to engage in window-dressing-anticipating the reaction of the
audience and seeking plausible justifications for the otherwise desired
course of action.8 Where window-dressing can be found (or rational-
ized), the impact on primary behavior will be lessened. I agree that the
SEC's recent fascination-prompted by politics as much as anything-
with full disclosure relating to executive compensation is an example of
sunlight having very little disinfectant power. A board's compensation
report and a performance graph easily become the subject of rationaliza-
tion and self-serving inference that blunt any sense of embarrassment.
Indeed, there may sometimes be perverse effects to mandatory disclo-
sure. My intuition is that disclosure is most effective when it forces the
identification of the laggard-the one whose behavior is in some recog-
nizable way inferior to his peers in terms of a consensus about social re-
spectability. In other words, it helps induce what sociologists call a "mi-
metic" process,9 or in more pedestrian terms, organizational conformity.
7. Of course disclosure is a commonly invoked mechanism by which workers, con-
sumers, and other agencies can gain useful information. I am not doubting the efficacy of
this in general, but simply saying that this is not a proper function of securities law. To this
I would add some doubt as to whether issuer management always has an accurate sense of
the nature and consequences of its policies on other stakeholders. I suspect that there is a
good deal of corporate "myth-making" by which managers fail to perceive the harms they
may be doing. See generally Donald C. Langevoort, Organized Illusions: A Behavioral
Theory of Why Corporations Mislead Stock Market Investors (and Cause Other Social
Harms), 146 U. PA. L. REV. 101 (1997).
8. See Donald C. Langevoort, Ego, Human Behavior, and Law, 81 VA. L. REV. 853,
865-72 (1995) (stating that a person may fail to recognize, or try to justify, the wrongful-
ness of his own actions in order to bolster his self-image); see also Langevoort, supra note
7, at 143-46 (concluding that management is susceptible to an approach wherein they "see
what they want to see").
9. See Paul J. DiMaggio & Walter W. Powell, The Iron Cage Revisited: Institutional
Isomorphism and Collective Rationality in Organizational Fields, 48 AM. SOC. REV. 147,
151-52 (1983) (arguing that mimetic isomorphism, one of three mechanisms by which insti-
[Vol. 48:93
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In the compensation area, however, it may, if anything, have caused
companies to raise compensation faster than it might have otherwise, as
peer payments become more visible and companies want to be at least
competitive and-if they believe their executives are "special"-supra-
competitive. The idea that boards who choose the CEO are motivated to
see him or her as "special" should come as no surprise.'1 This herding
kind of behavior could also have some troublesome effects in other areas
as well. For instance, would mandatory disclosure of a broad range of
corporate charitable contributions inhibit companies from making con-
tributions either in amounts substantially greater than their peers or
(more importantly) to causes that might be deemed overly controver-
sial?"
I have one other important concern. By most accounts, the SEC is a
highly successful administrative agency, even though it remains a bu-
reaucracy with predictable flaws. 2 My sense is that one dominating rea-
son for the success of the SEC is the focus that comes from a clearly de-
fined mission-the protection of investors against overreaching by
promoters, managers, and the like. This mission is the focus of the
Commission's culture, sometimes transmitted with what seems almost a
theological fervor, 3 and is largely (though not entirely) apolitical. One
can be extremely conservative and yet agree that, under some circum-
stances, markets work better because of the intervention of public disclo-
14
sure requirements and antifraud enforcement. Securities regulation,
tutional isomorphic changes occur, results from standard responses to uncertainty); see
generally Donna M. Randall & Douglas D. Baker, The Threat of Legal Liability and
Managerial Decision Making: Regulation of Reproductive Health in the Workplace, in THE
LEGALISTIC ORGANIZATION 169 (Sim B. Sitkin & Robert J. Bies eds., 1994) (providing
an illuminating study of the relationship between organizational conformity and moral de-
cision making).
10. See Langevoort, supra note 8, at 876-78 ("Having chosen either to hire or retain
the chief executive officer, and often having superficially endorsed his or her major poli-
cies, the board is primed to allow the wisdom of those collective decisions to emerge over
time").
11. See generally Faith Stevelman Kahn, Pandora's Box: Managerial Discretion and
the Problem of Corporate Philanthropy, 44 UCLA L. REV. 579 (1997) (providing a study
of the charitable contribution problems). See also Symposium, Corporate Philanthropy
Law, Culture, and Education and Politics, 41 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 753 (1997) (foreword by
Faith Stevelman Kahn).
12. See Donald C. Langevoort, The SEC as a Bureaucracy: Public Choice, Institu-
tional Rhetoric, and the Process of Policy Formulation, 47 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 527
(1990).
13. See id. at 531.
14. Of course, politics plays an important role in the day-to-day functioning of the
Commission, even on disclosure matters, but political considerations tend to be at the
margins rather than on the question of whether mandatory disclosure and aggressive en-
1998]
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properly administered, can be seen not as paternalism, but rather as an
effort to optimize the cost of capital, justifying regulation on efficiency
grounds. The introduction of the protection of potentially conflicting
noninvestor interests as a regulatory objective is contrary to this focus,
and would threaten a coherence that has long existed at the agency.
This is particularly important when we recognize the breadth and
complexity of potential stakeholder interests. Labor unions are a good
example. 5 To what extent are incumbent employees privileged over
those less identifiable who might gain if there were changes? How are
labor interests versus consumer (or environmental) interests to be bal-
anced? There is no consensus on such questions; the answers could only
be intensely political and ideological. Although it is impossible to prove,
I believe that the Commission would be much less effective through a
loss of cultural continuity were its agenda broadened in such a way. Dis-
closure for the benefit of other stakeholders often may be appropriate,
but it should be the responsibility of another agency.
Of course, investors are not homogeneous, and even if investor protec-
tion remains the sole focus of the Agency, it does not follow automati-
cally that disclosure of issuer-related information regarding its treatment
of other stakeholders is inappropriate. This brings us to the other kind of
stakeholder disclosure argument noted at the outset. Some investors
have less financially-oriented utility functions, and there can be linkages
between the treatment of stakeholder interests and financial returns. But
here again, I would resist any effort to redefine the Commission's objec-
tive away from the protection of the financial interests of investors, for
exactly the same reason just identified. The financial interests of inves-
tors are still the dominating concern, perhaps overwhelmingly so. Any
significant move away from that focus becomes intensely political and
ideological, with a resulting loss of simplicity and, inevitably, a sense of
organizational tradition.
That leads me to the belief that proposed stakeholder-related disclo-
sure subjects should have to pass fairly rigorous tests for what has been
termed "quantitative" materiality, that is, some relatively tight coupling
between the required disclosure and investment risk or return. Although
I would love to be proven wrong, I doubt that there will be, anytime
soon, good empirical tests linking social performance and financial return
in a useful predictive way. There are too many contingencies in the na-
forcement are good things. Indeed, some Republican-led periods of the SEC have been
notable for the aggressiveness of their enforcement efforts.
15. See generally Schwab & Thomas, supra note 4 (describing realignment challenges
to corporate governance posed by union-shareholder activism).
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ture of the business, company history, and the current dynamics of its
capital, labor, and product markets. I suspect that identification of such
relationships will be more obvious to those ideologically committed to
the interests of the stakeholder group in question than to anyone else.
Only when greedy investment analysts and money managers take an in-
terest in social performance and begin to demand stakeholder-oriented
disclosure will we know that we are really on to something. 6
Having said this, I should make clear that certain kinds of questions
that have been debated under the rubric of "qualitative materiality" have
such a nexus to investor well-being. For instance, I tend to agree with
the trend in the courts that treats undisclosed illegality (whether under
investigation or not) as material if either: (a) after applying the probabil-
ity/magnitude test, the illegality would upon discovery have a significant
impact on the company's business or financial condition; or, (b) the ille-
gality suggests a propensity of one or more senior executives to act dis-
loyally or recklessly. 7 It is of course nonsensical to expect disclosure of
such information in a 10-K, except in those situations where the company
has already taken remedial action. Yet if there is some breach of an in-
dependent duty to disclose, the concealment should be actionable if for
no other reason than investors can be injured directly by the misrepre-
sentation or nondisclosure. 8 Similarly, I am persuaded that additional
disclosure relating to a company's charitable contributions is warranted,
based on my sense that we are often talking about either a managerial
prerequisite or, in more extreme cases, a form of self-dealing.' 9 That is
not far from the core "agency cost" concern of securities disclosure. But
this is based on a desire to control or restrain improper contributions, not
as a means of encouraging some socially optimal level of corporate giv-
ing.
If I have any qualms about this public endorsement of investor pri-
macy, it is the sense that by identifying financial risk and return as the
16. Admittedly, there is the circular point that until this information is disclosed, we
will have no way of testing its materiality. That, however, gives short shrift to the alterna-
tive ways that investors have of gaining insight into the stakeholder-related practices of
companies. Indeed, one can make the argument that the stakeholders themselves are bet-
ter sources of information on this issue than company managers.
17. See Roeder v. Alpha Industries, Inc. 814 F.2d 22, 25 (1st Cir. 1987) (providing
grounds when information about bribery may be considered material).
18. For example, a company that misrepresents its compliance with FTC regulations
would surely be causing compensable financial harm to purchasers of the company's secu-
rities. See Craftmatic Sec. Litig. v. Kraftsow, 890 F.2d 628, 640 (3d Cir. 1990).
19. See Kahn, supra note 11, at 624-25 (arguing that federal and state law condone a
manager's ability to use corporate contributions for his or her own interest at the expense
of shareholders).
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exclusive agenda item for the Commission, there is something of a social
signal about what is important and what is not. I do not believe that
maximizing anyone's return on investment is the highest social or moral
good, and I accept that public discourse and the framing of economic is-
sues does have an effect on values and attitudes. How we think and talk
about markets, publicly and privately, does have important moral conse-
quences." I suspect, however, that there are better means than SEC dis-
closure for promoting a more inclusive social discourse.
20. See Samuel Bowles, Endogenous Preferences. The Cultural Consequences of Mar-
kets and Other Economic Institutions, 36 J. ECON. LITERATURE 75 (1998).
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